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《Abstract》
This is a conceptual application of incomplete contract theory to the 
eurozone fiscal governance game between the European Commission and 
France over the latter’s budget deficit reduction. Yutaka Suzuki’s model of 
renegotiation in incomplete contract games is applied. A car-part supplier 
and a car-assembler are engaged in renegotiation over a car part’s quality 
and setting a new price for it if its quality fails to meet the level promised in 
an initial contact. The model focuses on the incentive incorporated in a 
fixed price in incomplete contracting and makes it possible to illuminate the 
critical factors, a combination of the lack of flexile sanctioning and sufficient 
incentive, in analyzing how the European Commision has failed to enforce 
the EU fiscal rules.
Ⅰ　Introduction
This is an incomplete contract approach to the eurozone fiscal 
governance between the European Commission (the Commission) and 
France. Yutaka Suzuki’s model of renegotiation in incomplete contract 
games is applied here. A car-part supplier as an agent and a car-assembler 
as the principal are engaged in renegotiation over an initial contract to set a 
new price, rather than terminating the contract, if the quality of a car-part 
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fails to meet the level promised in the initial contract. Renegotiation is an 
incomplete contract approach to undoing ex post inefficiency realized after 
implementing the initial contract. 
The Commission and France are engaged in renegotiation over setting a 
new target year for France to meet the deficit limit, below 3 per cent of 
GDP, after its failure despite the initial agreement.  
The part-supplier and the car-assembler take a coordinated approach for 
team technology development. Similarly, the Commission and France take 
a coordinated approach to cutting the latter’s deficit to below 3 per cent of 
GDP. 
This renegotiation model deals with what roles a fixed price plays to 
provide the part-supplier with necessary incentive in incomplete 
contracting. It enables us to see how critical incentive problems are in 
explaining eurozone states’ failures to comply with the EU fiscal rules. The 
eurozone fiscal governance lacks flexible sanctioning against member states 
in correspondence to their deficit levels. 
In the team technology development in which the car-part supplier and 
the car assembler are engaged, there exists a sufficiently large price gap 
between lower prices for a lower quality part and a higher fixed price for a 
good quality part. This induces the part-supplier to make ex ante 
investment so that it can sell its good quality product at the higher fixed 
price.
A eurozone fiscal governance game between the Commission and any 
eurozone state has the same features as the team investment above and can 
thus be analyzed with Suzuki’s model of renegotiation over division of 
surplus between the part-supplier and the car-assembler in the incomplete 
contract game.
Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole also include in incomplete contract 
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games supranational authority－states relations in which they are engaged 
in a team project.1）
There are two types of approaches to agency problems in which a 
principal and an agent have conflicts of interest, while being engaged in a 
team project. One is a vertical integration, in which control right is 
transferred from an agent to a principal. With vertical integration, an agent 
is now made to be part of the principal’s organization. Their conflicts of 
interest are then solved with this vertical integration between them.2）
There is still the problem of legal power and real power. While the 
principal has the legal power to decide which project should be chosen to 
pursue, the agent knows projects better and exercises real power over 
decisions to choose the optimum one. The asymmetric information 
approach is used to analyze this type of agency problem. 
The principal would do better to delegate executing powers to the agent 
when the principal has only soft information on projects. With soft 
information on projects, it is hard to tell which one should be chosen. On 
the other hand, the agent has hard information on projects and can know 
which one has a better chance for success and will bear larger benefit.3）
Asymmetric information between them enables the agent to obtain 
information rent at the sacrifice of the principal’s interest. By 
strengthening monitoring over the agent, the principal can make this rent 
smaller.4）
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1） Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole, “Formal and Real Authority in Organization,”Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 105, No. 1, (February 1997), p. 5.
2） Aghion and Tirole, ibid., p. 3 and p. 7. 
3） Aghion and Tirole, ibid., pp. 3-5. “Hard information about a project’s payoffs can be 
costlessly and instantaneously verified by the other party if communicated by the party who 
collected it. Soft information cannot be verified by the other party.” Aghion and Tirole, ibid., 
p. 7.
14
In eurozone fiscal governance, though it is far short of being called 
“vertical integration,” a key step towards vertical integration had been 
taken in the aftermath of the 2010－2012 financial crisis.
First, a semi-automatic sanctions mechanism was incorporated into the 
EU fiscal rules in December 2011. It largely enhanced the Commission’s 
powers to impose fines on eurozone states repeatedly breaching the EU 
fiscal rules.5） It was at least a partial transfer of “control right” or 
sovereignty to the supranational authority, the Commission.
Second, the “European semester” was institutionalized into eurozone 
states’ budgetary process. This enables the Commission to scrutinize their 
budget plans over nearly six months from around May to September and 
October before the budget finalizations. If the budget plans are 
unsatisfactory due to large deviations from the deficit limit, they will not be 
passed by the Commission and will be sent back to their parliaments for 
revisions. Revisions would be controversial for their governments. This 
pressures eurozone states into making their budget plans more acceptable 
to the Commission. 
Ⅱ　Incomplete contract theory
Jean Tirole points out that complete contracting is based on the 
assumption of no limit to information in writing contracts: “[T]here is no 
4） Yutaka Suzuki, “Towards building a theory on ‘commitment, renegotiations and incomplete 
contract’ theory,” Keizai Shirin (The Hosei University Economic Review), Vol. 66, No. 1 
(July 1998), pp. 311-312. Aghion and Tirole, ibid., pp. 2-4.
5） This empowerment of the Commission is described as: “During the eurozone’s sovereign 
debt crisis, the European Commission was given extra clout to enforce the 3 per cent rule, 
including the power to impose fines on countries that flout the budget rules or badly exceed 
their targets.” Adam Thomson and Alex Baker, “France calls for deficit leniency,” Financial 
Times (hereafter the FT), 15 August 2014, p. 3. 
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limitation on the parties’ ability to foresee contingencies, to write 
contracts, and to enforce them.”6） However, the reality is that contracting 
parties can write “a number of possible states of nature ex ante in contract” 
but that “[p]arties to a contract initially do not know which state of nature 
will prevail” and that “[e]x post they all observe the realization of the state 
of nature.”7）
He also states that to write “[an] optimal contingent contract,” the 
information of “the state of nature” must be elicited “from the agents in a 
manner that uniquely implements the state-contingent allocation.”8） 
Especially, “a variable which is ‘observable by the parties’ but ‘not’ 
observable ‘by the court’” matters. It is by nature “nonverifiable.” To 
implement “the state-contingent allocation,” a “nonverifiable” but 
“observable” variable is indispensable. However, the principals cannot 
elicit such a variable unless it is made to be “payoff-relevant when it is 
learned by the parties.”9）
R&D exemplifies the case of the point above. First, if the agents are not 
sure the principal will be willing to pay a price not lower than “the license 
fee”10） which is “determined according to some sequential bargaining 
process,”11） “[i]nefficiency will result.”12） The agents will not transfer their 
technological developments at any price lower than the license fee. Trade 
does not take place, though it is socially efficient. “The challenge is 
therefore to elicit the state of nature from the agents in a manner that 
An Incomplete Contract Approach to the Eurozone Fiscal Governance over France
6） Jean Tirole, “Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?” Econometrica, Vol. 67, No. 4 
(July, 1999), p. 754.
7） Tirole, “Incomplete Contract,” ibid., p. 754.
8） Tirole, “Incomplete Contract,” ibid., p. 754.
9） Tirole, “Incomplete Contract,” ibid., pp. 754-5.
10） Tirole, ibid., pp. 752-753.
11） Tirole, ibid., p. 748.
12） Tirole, ibid., p. 752.
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uniquely implements the state-contingent allocation.”13）
Second, the court allows the parties to renegotiate if trade breaks down 
for the reason above. “[S]uch a trade, if voluntary, necessarily improves 
the welfare of all parties. So, even if the commitment not to allow future 
trades is ex ante socially optimal, it is no longer ex post socially optimal.”14） 
Through renegotiation, such information needs to be made payoff-relevant 
so that it will be transferred at a price not lower than the license fee.
In more general terms, Tirole summarizes points of information that limit 
complete contracting: the agents may have private information at the time 
of contracting which may lead to adverse selection; the agents also 
“receive future information that cannot be directly verified by contract 
enforcement authorities; this information may be private information 
(hidden knowledge); and agents may take actions that cannot be verified 
(moral hazard).”15）
In eurozone fiscal governance, the Commission needs to elicit a large 
enough effort from France to decrease its deficit below 3 per cent of GDP. 
This is exactly equivalent to the principal attempting to elicit valuable 
information on R&D developments from the agent. Any success for R&D 
needs the agents’ higher efforts. The Commission must provide France with 
incentive strong enough to induce the latter to act appropriately.
Ⅲ　Timeline of incomplete contract on France’s deficit reduction
As a first step to identifying the nature of the governance game between 
the Commission and France over the latter’s deficit reduction, a timeline is 
13） Tirole, ibid., p. 754.
14） Tirole, ibid.. p. 753.
15） Tirole, ibid., p. 754.
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set out below, following the concept of incomplete contract.
Source: This is a modified version of a timeline of an incomplete contract 
from Yutaka Suzuki, “Towards building a theory on ‘commitment, 
renegotiations and incomplete contract,’”　KEIZAI SHIRIN (The Hosei 
University Economic Review), Vol. 66, No. 1 (July 1998), p. 320.
In applying the framework of incomplete contract, the point of making an 
initial contract is set here for convenience to be October 2013.16） In 
October 2013, the Commission and France agreed on resetting the target 
year for France to bring down the latter’s deficit below 3 per cent of GDP 
to be 2015.17） (In fall 2011, the target year for France was originally set to 
be 2013, but in the first-time renegotiation in May 2013, the Commission 
agreed to postpone it to 2015.)
Figure 1: Timeline of incomplete contract on France’s deficit reduction
contract
signed
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4
investment
by agent
renegotiating
contract
investments by
agent and principal
Time
initial
contract
output Q realized
with uncertainty
default or
revise contract
into ﬁnal one
meeting
deﬁcit target
payoﬀ
realization
and its division
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16） Renegotiation in October 2013 was in fact the Commission’s attempt to reset the target year 
for France to meet the deficit target. The Commission set the target at 2015, delaying by two 
years. But it is treated here as the timing of making the initial contract between the 
Commission and France. Such an artificial conversion is made here for simplicity to avoid a 
repetition of renegotiation. France has negotiated to delay meeting the target year several 
times.
17） The target year was in fact originally set in 2011 for France to be 2013. But through the first-
time renegotiation in May 2013, the Commission agreed to reset it to be 2015.
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At t=1, the Commission and France sign the initial contract on the 
reduction of France’s deficit below 3 per cent of GDP in 2015. 
At t=2, France makes ex ante investment to realize deficit reduction 
below 3 per cent of GDP. It takes the form of cutting government 
expenditures, raising taxes and implementing structural reforms for mid-
term growth. These efforts are all politically costly.
However, if France could carry them out, it would make itself free of any 
fines and of budgetary interference from the Commission. Not to have fines 
imposed and to maintain budgetary sovereignty work as critical incentives 
for France to make ex ante investment of cutting back deficit.
At t=2, as a result of France’s ex ante investment, France’s deficit level 
(or the output Q) is also realized with uncertainty.
At t=3 if France’s deficit level exceeds the deficit limit of 3 per cent of 
GDP, the Commission renegotiates with France over the terms of the 
initial contract. In incomplete contract theory, renegotiation is defined: 
“After the contract by the parties is implemented, the parties can ‘at stage 
3’ write a new contract and thereby undo any inefficient outcome.”18）
Through renegotiation and by signing a final contract, the principal 
provides the agent with necessary incentive for making investment to undo 
the inefficient state realized at t=2. 
The Commission, the principal, has an option to default on the initial 
contract by terminating transactions with France and imposing sanctions on 
it. 
Or the Commission can choose to revise it through renegotiation. The 
principal is better off by renegotiating the initial contract and by setting a 
new price, P*0, than terminating the initial one. Terminating the initial 
18） Tirole, “Incomplete Contracts,” ibid. p. 759.
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contract ends up with payoff 0, since there is no transaction. By 
renegotiating the initial terms of the contract and setting the new price, the 
principal gets half of the surplus, 1/2S, rather than 0.
By completing the transaction, the team project, the principal can put on 
the market the final product equipped with the car-part (or the output Q) 
the agent developed,  which is also applied together with the technology 
the assembler developed. This produces surplus S. The assembler receives 
half of this, 1/2S, and the agent receives the remaining half, 1/2S, if their 
bargaining powers are supposed to be equal.
By accepting the renegotiation proposal from the principal, the agent 
obtains its output Q sold to the principal and also receives half of the 
surplus, 1/2S. It obtains Q + 1/2 S altogether. 
If the initial contract is terminated, the agent has no option other than to 
sell the output Q in open markets and receives only Q. It cannot receive 
1/2S.
Thus, the agent can neither reject the renegotiation offer from the 
principal nor demand a larger share of surplus S than the one originally 
agreed upon. In renegotiation, a renegotiation-proof mechanism is put in 
place. It allows renegotiation to undo ex post inefficiency only when the 
state realized at t=2 is the Bad State.19）
At t=4, the agent first makes a relation-specific investment such as 
cutting deficit below 3 percent of GDP to meet the target year newly set 
through renegotiation.
Since this is the team production, the Commission also has to make its 
investment, I, in a relation-specific way. Their investments are 
complementary.
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19） Yutaka Suzuki, ibid., p. 325. 
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At t=4, payoffs for the agent, France, and the principal, the Commission, 
will also be materialized. As stated earlier, the principal receives 1/2S, 
while the agent receives Q + 1/2S.
France will secure assistance measures for deficit reduction in exchange 
for its efforts to meet the deficit target.  
The Commission will obtain France’s compliance with the EU fiscal rules 
by bringing the latter’s deficit under control.
Ⅳ　Fixed price, flexible pricing and incentive for ex ante investment
１　Incentive problem for ex ante investment
In an incomplete contract, an agent’s technology investment ex ante is 
supposed to be relation-specific and unverifiable. This nature poses a risk 
for the agent. It deters the agent from making such an investment ex ante. 
Because of the non-verifiability, the agent cannot claim rewards for its 
contribution to joint production through the investment ex ante. His 
investment becomes a “sunk cost.” His investment cannot be retrieved. 
This is called the “hold up” problem.20）
The principal attempts to exploit the agent’s unverifiable investment ex 
ante to his advantage. This leads to inefficiency ex ante and ex post.21）
Even before that, being unverifiable means that the principal and the 
agent cannot write payoff for the agent’s contribution into their contract 
beforehand.
It is too costly to write “an ex ante contract contingent on the realized 
20） Shinsuke Kanbe, A Primer in Game Theory & Informational Economics (Tokyo: Nippon 
Hyoronsha, 2004), p. 293. 
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state.” Cost involved in such a “fine-tuned” contract exceeds any benefits 
from it.22）
In combination with investment by the principal which follows the agent’s 
preceding investment, however, if the agent’s investment ex ante bears net 
profit for the society of the principal and the agent, such investment ex 
ante is socially preferable and should be made.
However, the problem here is how the investment ex ante can be 
secured, while the agent’s right to payoff for its contribution cannot be 
specifically spelled out in a contract beforehand because of its non-
verifiability. 
 Furthermore, if the principal refuses to purchase the product developed 
by the agent with technology invested ex ante, the agent faces a serious 
problem. Despite ex ante investment, it cannot put the product and 
technology for this on open markets for general use because the nature of 
the technology is relation-specific and is very much for limited-use.
Given the nature of these two factors, there must be an incentive 
arrangement which can induce the agent to make ex ante such a relation-
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21） Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont, Contract Theory (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
MIT Press, 2005), p. 491.
 　Based on O. Hart and J. Moore, Bolton and Dewatripont summarize “the holdup problem” 
involved in a team investment due to uncertainty derived from a seller’s ex ante valuation of a 
product’s value which a seller provides ex post and due to uncertainty derives from a seller’s 
ex ante valuation of its production cost: “The utility they obtain from trading depends on the 
buyer’s valuation v and the seller’s production cost c. These utilities are uncertain at the time 
of contracting and can be influenced by specific investment made by each party at an earlier 
date. . . The contracting problem . . . is one where the state of nature θ= (v, c) and the 
investment levels i and j are not contractable, although θ is observable to both contracting 
parties ex post. If there is spot contracting ex post, after θis realized and investments i and j 
are sunk, and if the gains from trade at that point are evenly divided between buyer and 
seller, there will be underinvestment in equilibrium.” Bolton and Dewatripont, ibid., pp. 560-
562.       
22） Bolton and Dewatripont, ibid., p. 491.
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specific investment. A fixed price in an incomplete contract is exactly such 
an arrangement.23）
2　France’s deficit reduction as ex ante relation-specific investment
How can we identify France’s deficit reduction and structural reforms to 
be relation- specific in their nature? Amid deflationary pressures facing the 
eurozone since 2014, cutting back government expenditures would 
accelerate them.
By far France’s greatest such effort was “the Responsibility Pact”. The 
Hollande government put it forth in January 2014, promising to cut tax for 
businesses by €40bn and cut government expenditures by €50bn over 2015 
to 2017.
Cutting tax has a pro-growth effect. But cutting government 
expenditures puts further deflationary pressures upon the French economy. 
Unless compelled by the EU fiscal rules, it would have preferred expanding 
fiscal stimuli.
The restriction upon France’s policy choices above thus derived 
specifically from the contract based on the EU fiscal rules with the 
Commission over its deficit reduction. France’s policy efforts or investment 
ex ante had been thus relation-specific in nature. 
3　Non-verifiability of France’s ex ante investment
At the point of making the initial contract in May 2013, the Commission 
was unable to specify efforts which France had to make to meet the deficit 
limit. Among factors which are involved for this unpredictability, two are 
very salient.
23） Kanbe, ibid., pp. 288-295.
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One is the difficulty to predict future economic growth rates. Whether 
France can meet the deficit target or not depends critically on its growth 
rates. If its economy grows as predicted, there are expected revenues. But 
if the growth rates turn out lower than expected, revenues fall and the 
deficit becomes larger. Often the Commission warns eurozone states not to 
make the real future size of a deficit look smaller by making over-optimistic 
growth estimations. 
The other is the Commission’s limit of surveillance over eurozone states’ 
budget deficits due to decentralization of budgetary authority. Under the 
current monetary union, which lacks a fiscal union, budgetary powers are 
decentralized to member states. The Commission can make mainly 
macroeconomic surveillance focusing on their deficit figures and has 
difficulty to interfere deeply enough in specific budgetary planning. 
Therefore, the Commission could only ask, for example, France in 
November 2014 to come up with a credible and persuasive plan to put itself 
on course to meet the 3 per cent deficit limit rule.24）
Jean Tirole differentiates two types of monitoring in financing. One is 
passive monitoring. The other is active monitoring. The former is the one 
only practiced by share- holders over companies whose stocks they hold. It 
is aimed at measuring “value of asset in place” to “[take] a picture of the 
health of the firm at various points of time.” It is also “retrospective.” The 
Commission’s fiscal monitoring over eurozone states seems to have been 
closer to passive monitoring, given its decentralized system of budgetary 
powers. 
The latter is the one that a large investor such as a bank carries out with 
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24） Jean Tirole points out: “[I]nvestment is worth funding only if the financial contract with the 
investors induces the entrepreneur to behave.” Jean Tirole, “Corporate Governance,” 
Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 1 (January, 2001), p. 6.
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respect to a firm at considerable cost to which it is a big creditor. It is 
“prospective” and attempts to “[affect] the value of assets in place” by 
“[preventing] the most egregious forms of misbehavior.”25）
Under the system of budgetary decentralization in the eurozone, the 
Commission’s fiscal monitoring seems to have been closer to passive 
monitoring. With the introduction of the Commission’s budgetary review, 
however, the eurozone’s monitoring has moved closer to active monitoring.
As described in the analytical timeline, the outcome Q becomes realized 
with uncertain probability at t=2.  
Only at the point of renegotiation in October 201426）, t=3, the 
Commission was able to make precise and specific demands on France as 
conditions for extending the target year by another two years to 2017. It 
demanded that France had to cut structural deficit by 0.8 per cent points. 
France promised a 0.3 per cent point cut. Both came to an agreement on a 
0.5 per cent point cut. 
Specific demands of this kind were made possible only when it became 
clear near the end of the initial contract, t= 2, how much more deficit 
reduction was necessary from France’s budget plan before it could get at 
least a passing grade for another extension of the target year.
As another case for non-verifiability of ex ante investment, there exists 
the Commission’s distrust towards France’s commitment and ability to 
implement ex ante investment. For example, in December 2014 which was 
part of the renegotiation period of t=3, the conflicts of interest between the 
Commission and France were brought to light. While demanding 
implementation of structural reforms as a condition for passing France’s 
25） Tirole, ibid., pp. 8-9.
26） October 2014 was in fact the time of the second renegotiation. But it is treated here as the 
first-time renegotiation.
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budget plan, the Commission suspected whether the Hollande government 
had the ability to carry out politically costly reforms such as liberalizing the 
notary and pharmacist professions and labor markets. It was too weak to 
carry them out. The Commission was concerned that the implementation 
process would be beaten back by domestic opposition.27）
Gunther Ottinger, a political ally of the German chancellor Angela 
Merkel, was opposed to the Commission’s accepting France’s budget plan 
unless it secured “very clear, concrete” and “not ambiguous enough” 
measures “in return.”28） Emmanuel Macron, economic minister in the 
Hollande government, also described past French reforms flatly as being 
“fake.”29）
The above suggests it would have been considerably difficult to predict or 
assess beforehand how much efforts France would have made during the 
period of ex ante investment or to what extent these efforts would have 
brought about the necessary results. This made it difficult for the 
Commission and France to write a complete contract at t=1.
Ⅴ　Fixed price as incentive for ex ante investment: application 
of fixed price in the eurozone fiscal governance 
An Incomplete Contract Approach to the Eurozone Fiscal Governance over France
27） Editorial, “The struggle for reform in France and Italy,” the FT, 13 and 14 December 2014, 
p. 8.
28） Peter Spiegel, “Merkel ally questions Hollande’s ‘willingness’ to fix French economy,” the 
FT, 21 November 2014, p. 1.
29） Hugh Carnegy and Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, “France demands ‘real money’ boost for EU,” 
the FT, 19 November 2014, p. 3.
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Source: Yutaka Suzuki, “Towards building a theory on ‘commitment, 
renegotiations and incomplete contract’,” KEIZAI SHIRIN (The Hosei 
University Economic Review), Vol. 66, No. 1 (July 1998), Figure 4, p. 328.
Figure 2 is a model that describes renegotiation at t=3. This illustrates 
how a fixed price works as the key incentive for the agent to make ex ante 
investment.
In Figure 2, the horizontal axis shows the state of quality of an output, Q. 
It has two states, the Bad State or the Good State, which the agent 
produces with technology ex ante invested.
The vertical axis shows bargaining powers between the agent and the 
principal over surplus, S, or over the division of surplus deriving from the 
product’s level of quality.  They are reflected in the price at which the 
agent, the car-part supplier, can sell its output to the principal, the car-
Figure 2: Fixed price as incentive － analytical framework
New Price
Fixed Price
Bad State Good State
Flexible Pricing
０
P＊(Q)
P０
P０－1/2S
P０－S
1/2S
Q(State)
Quality level of
product agent produces
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assembler. The price is in correspondence to the output’s level of quality on 
the horizontal axis.
If the agent’s investment ex ante goes well, the realized state of the 
output is in the Good State. If his investment ex ante goes badly, the 
realized state of the output is in the Bad State.
The dot ● on the horizontal axis shows the threshold for the output’s 
quality in the Good State. Once the level of the output’s quality reaches the 
threshold, P0－S, the price at which the agent can sell jumps upward from 
P0－1/2S to P0 in Figure 2.　P0 is the fixed price. This is the discontinuous 
jump in price from ○ to ● on the vertical axis. Similarly, the price the 
agent can sell its output discontinuously falls if its quality fails even slightly 
to meet the threshold level, P0－S.
   The price (or the agent’s bargaining power over surplus S) 
corresponding to ○ quality is only P0－1/2S. However, once the output’s 
quality reaches point ● on the quality scale, 1/2S is added to P0－1/2S, 
making the price P0. This big jump to or fall from ● in price works as a 
critical incentive for the agent to make ex ante investment.
Under this fixed price system, incentives are put in place at three points.
First, the price for the output with the quality of ○ jumps to P0, if the 
output’s quality reaches to P0－S.
P0－S is the point which makes Q equal to P0－S (Q=P0－S). In other 
words, it is the point where the output’s quality just meets the level of 
quality necessary for the fixed price.
Second, as the equation above suggests, if the output’s quality reaches P0－S, 
the agent secures S (or 1) bargaining power over any additional surplus by 
improving the product’s quality beyond the threshold point. This gain in the 
agent’s bargaining power over additional surplus is the second incentive for 
it.  
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For example, in the eurozone fiscal governance, if France meets the 
deficit limit of 3 per cent of GDP, it can use at its disposal any residual from 
additional deficit reduction.
On the other hand, if the product’s quality falls even slightly from ●, the 
price falls discontinuously and sharply from P0 to P0－1/2S. The agent loses 
1/2 S.
Third, when the output’s quality remains from 0 to ○ on the quality 
scale, the state realized at t=2 is in the Bad State. Throughout this state, 
the agent and the principal renegotiate on the terms of the initial contract 
to undo ex post inefficiency. Since renegotiation is done through the Nash 
bargaining solution (the NBS), surplus deriving from undoing ex post 
inefficiency is divided according to their bargaining powers. If their 
bargaining powers are supposed to be equal, each gets 1/2S. This gives the 
agent an incentive to improve ex post inefficiency.
Thus, under this model of incentive contracts, incentive schemes are 
placed at three important points throughout the whole range of quality 
scale from 0 to ○, from ○ to P0－S, and beyond P0－S.  
Ⅵ　“Fixed Price” in the eurozone fiscal governance - application
In the context of eurozone fiscal governance, the fixed price should be 
the budget deficit limit of 3 per cent of GDP signed in the initial contract 
between the Commission and France at t=1, October 2013.
If the 3 per cent deficit limit is the incentive corresponding to the fixed 
price, why has it failed so far to induce France to bring deficit below the 
limit through ex ante investment? 
First, the EU fiscal rules lack “flexible pricing.” It is the precondition for 
the fixed price to work as an incentive. 
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In Figure 2, the transfer price at which the principal purchases the 
output changes flexibly along the line of 1/2S on the vertical axe to ○ in the 
center top in Figure 2 in correspondence to the output’s state on the 
quality scale Q ranging from 0 to P0－S. 
At point 0 on the quality scale Q, in correspondence to the product’s 
lowest level in quality, the agent makes only 1/2S. This means that the 
agent can claim 1/2 over any surplus S materialized by improving the 
output’s quality above 0.
Once the state of the product reaches the point at P0－S, the agent can 
sell the product at the fixed price, P0.
As Figure 2 shows, there is a considerable price gap between P0 and P0－
1/2S. Furthermore, after reaching the threshold P0－S on the quality scale, 
the agent can have S over additional surplus from improvement in quality 
beyond P0－S. This price gap provides the agent with an incentive for 
achieving the quality of P0－S. 
Once France meets the 3 per cent deficit limit, it can be set free from the 
Commission’s budgetary interference. If it is able to cut deficit more than 
the deficit limit, it can control all budgetary residuals. It can allocate the 
residuals to any programs free of the Commission’s interference.
Why, then, has the 3 per cent deficit limit failed to work? 
Under the dichotomy of either imposing the fine of 0.2 per cent of GDP 
or not, the Commission has hardly employed the kind of “Flexible Pricing” 
shown in Figure 2. If the Commission could impose fines flexibly upon 
eurozone states in correspondence to their deficit levels, they would have 
no way to escape from them. However, the Commission had not had this 
option of the flexible application of fines. This seems to be one of the 
reasons for its failure.  
Olli Rehn, the Commission vice president for economic and monetary 
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affairs under the Barrosso presidency, wrote in October 2014 that peer 
pressures, opprobrium and losing influence are the only factors that bring 
states breaching the fiscal rules into line with the EU fiscal rules.30） It 
suggests that the option of imposing fines has not been on the table for the 
Commissioner. 
The Commission considers cases of “egregious violations” of the EU 
fiscal rules as a reason for imposing fines. It warned in its official letter in 
late October 2014 that France’s 2015 budget plan with a deficit close to 4.5 
per cent of GDP was a case risking a violation.31）
However, Jean-Claude Juncker, the new European Commission president 
taking office in November 2014, changed the Commission’s practices on the 
EU fiscal rules. Under his presidency, the Commission seems more ready 
to introduce flexible pricing. In November 2014, the Commission judged 
that France had not made sufficient efforts to cut deficit in the budget plan 
for 2015 and moved very close to imposing the first fines upon France 
under the new EU budget rules.32）
France’s efforts for deficit reduction and reforms concerned EU officials, 
who felt them to be short of what the new fiscal rules required. France’s 
estimation of achieving a 0.5 per cent point reduction in structural deficit 
was based on “revenues seen uncertain at this state.” The 0.5 per cent 
reduction was considered in the budget review by the Commission to be the 
threshold for France to have its 2015 budget plan passed.33）
30） Olli Rehn and Jean Arthuis, “Only public opprobrium will press Rome and Paris into reform,” 
the FT, 30 October 2014, p. 9.
31） Adam Thomson, “France to cut extra €3.6bn from 2015 budget deficit,” the FT, 28 October 
2014, p. 4.
32） Michael Stothard, “Paris courts Brussels with moves to lift jobs market,” the FT, 11 
December 2014, p. 3.
33） Peter Spiegel, “Brussels urged to refocus on eurozone,” the FT, 9 December 2014, p. 2.
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Juncker gave the French budget plan a conditional passing grade, 
demanding that it come up with not promises but a credible and concrete 
plan to meet the deficit target.  Pierre Moscovici, the Commission vice 
president for economics and finance, warned that if France, Italy and 
Belgium failed to put their finances in order, the Commission would not 
hesitate to implement its duties.34）
Second, what is the incentive for eurozone states to meet the deficit 
limit? There is no equivalence to the incentive of the fixed Price in the 
eurozone fiscal governance. What eurozone states gain by meeting the 
deficit limit is to be set free of budgetary interference, especially the risk of 
fines, from the Commission. 
At t=3, the Commission renegotiates with eurozone states exceeding the 
deficit limit. Reviewing budget plans in October and November, the 
Commission demanded from France a 0.8 per cent point reduction of 
structural deficit (cyclically adjusted, net deficit) and from Italy a 0.7 per 
cent point reduction, respectively. France argued for a 0.2 per cent point 
reduction instead and Italy did so for a 0.1 per cent point reduction. 
However, France accepted a 0.5 per cent point reduction and Italy a 0.3 
per cent point reduction.35）
Prior to the Commission’s budget review, Matteo Renzi, the Italian 
prime minister, and François Hollande, the president of France, argued 
that the Commission had to ask Germany, a large current account surplus 
country, to stimulate growth in EU through large-scale infrastructure 
investments. It was quid pro quo for offsetting deflationary pressures upon 
the two states from their deficit reductions.
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34） Michou Akikuni, “the European Commission sees worsening deficits of France and Italy 
problems,” Japan Economic News, 29 November 2014, p. 6.
35） Peter Spiegels, “Europe clears France and Italy budgets,” the FT, 29 October 2014, p. 2.
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The Commission postponed the deadline of submissions of their revised 
2015 budget plans three months to March 2015. Rather than imposing 
sanctions, the Commission asked them to come up with credible revised 
plans to meet the deficit limit by 2017.
In renegotiation over how to meet the deficit target (“the fixed price”), 
the Commission linked, in a quid pro quo way, the EU investment plan with 
euro member states’ efforts for deficits reduction. 
At t=4, late November 2014, in fact, Junker announced a €315bn, less 
than 0.8 per cent of EU domestic product, investment plan in infrastructure 
to stimulate growth in EU over the period 2015 to 2017.36） He set 
“broadband or cross-border energy linkages” as “priority categories” of 
investment.37）
Ⅶ　Renegotiation
１　Case of the Bad State
How can payoffs be divided between a principal and an agent? It is done 
through the NBS as shown in Figure 3 below.38） In the NBS, if bargaining 
powers are supposed to be equal, surplus is divided equally between the 
agent and the principal.
Figure 3 illustrates bargaining between a part-supplier as the agent and a 
car-assembler as the principal. UA is utility for the agent. UP is utility for 
36） Peter Spiegel, “Brussels weighs options to build investment fund,” the FT, 17 November 
2014, p. 3.
37） Saram Gordon, “Industrialists query strategy behind Junker investment plan,” the FT, 5 
December 2014, p. 2.
38） Suzuki, ibid., p. 326.
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the principal.
0 is the disagreement point. (In this case, however, the disagreement 
point is Q. If their bargaining breaks down, the agent gets Q and the 
principal gets 0. Since the agent develops Q with his own ex ante 
investment and Q belongs to the agent as his private property, the 
disagreement point for the agent is Q. The agent keeps Q in his hands even 
if the principal defaults on the initial contract.) 
The area covered by the three points of Q +S on the vertical axis, Q +S 
on the horizontal axis and 0 is the feasible set within which agreements are 
feasible. The line Q +S and Q +S is the Pareto frontier.
Here their bargaining powers are supposed to be equal. When the state 
realized is Q, shown on the horizontal axis, surplus S which the team 
development program produces is divided by half. Where the dotted 
45-degree line from Q on the horizontal axis hits the Pareto frontier is the 
point at which surplus is divided. Surplus is thus divided equally, 1/2S 
each.
The point where the dotted vertical line from the dividing point on the 
Pareto frontier hits the horizontal line UA is Q+1/2S. There, the part-
supplier has both Q and 1/2S. 
Since the output Q is the product which the agent develops through his 
own ex ante relation-specific investment, Q belongs to the part-supplier as 
his private property. It can be transferred to the car-assembler at the fixed 
price if its quality, Q, is in the Good State. The part-supplier thus has Q 
+1/2S.
On the other hand, the point where the dotted horizontal line from the 
dividing point on the Pareto frontier hits the vertical line Up is the surplus 
the principal receives. It is 1/2S. Both thus divide the surplus equally.
After the contract at t=1, the agent will make ex ante investment. At 
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t=2, it will materialize output Q with uncertain probability. 
At t=3, the principal observes the state realized, Q.39）In Figure 3, Q is 
output and S is surplus. P0 is the fixed price.
In Figure 3, the realized state is Q + S. It is short of P0. In other words,
Q ＋S－P0　< 0. The realized state is in the Bad State.
Under this condition, even if the principal makes investments on his part, 
he gets only negative rent. It is Q + S－P0　< 0. He therefore loses money 
by purchasing Q at the price P0. The principal would do better to terminate 
the team development program. The agent therefore has to sell Q to other 
users at much lower prices on spot markets.40）
Figure 3: The Case of Bad State
０
Q＋S－P0
P0
Q＋S
Q＋S
Q＋1/2SQ
UP
UA
1/2S
39） Observability of the state Q is crucial. If the principal does not observe the state Q, the 
power of a renegotiation offer by the principal is greatly reduced in the Bad state.
40） Suzuki, ibid., pp. 322-324.
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Source: Yutaka Suzuki, “Towards building a theory on ‘commitment, 
renegotiations and incomplete contract theory’,”Keizai Shirin  (The Hosei 
University Economic Review), Vol. 66, No. 1 (July 1998), Figure 2(1), p. 
322.
The contract game in Figure 3 starts at t=1 when the principal and the 
agent first agree on an ex ante price or the fixed price, P0, for an outcome 
Q.
Q is the product’s quality level the agent produces with relation-specific 
technology investment at t=1.
At t=2, the output Q is realized with uncertain probability from ex ante 
investment by the agent.  
As Figure 3 shows, Q + S are short of P0. This is the case of the Bad 
State. The principal sees no benefit in making its part of the investment for 
the team production.41）
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I represents investment.
Source: Yutaka Suzuki, “Towards building a theory on ‘commitment, 
renegotiations and incomplete contract,’” Keizai Shirin (The Hosei 
University Economics Review), Vol.66, No.1 (July 1998), Figure 3(1) 
“i=0(No trade) is a case of credible threat: Q + S < P0,” p. 326
In Figure 4, the state realized at t=2 is Q + S < P0. The principal 
proposes renegotiation to the agent. The principal threatens the agent by 
asking whether he accepts his renegotiation proposal or faces default on the 
initial contract. This threat is credible42） because, backwardly inducing, if 
the principal terminates the transaction at t=3, the principal receives 0 and 
Figure 4: Renegotiation
Renegotiation
Try
A
P
P,A
Reject
Accept
Bargaining
Breakdown
No trade
No Try
P P
I
I
0
(Q＋S－P0＜0, P0)
(1/2S, Q＋1/2S)
(0, Q)
(0, Q)
(0, Q)
(0, Q)
2　Application to the Commission – France fiscal governance game
42） Suzuki, ibid., p. 325.
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the agent receives Q (0, Q). However, if the agent accepts a renegotiation 
proposal, the principal gains 1/2S and the agent gains Q + 1/2S. By 
accepting the renegotiation proposal, the agent can sell its product Q at a 
new price P*(Q) and obtains half the surplus, 1/2S. The agent thus gains 
the payoff of Q + 1/2S, which is larger than Q, which the agent receives 
when the transaction is terminated. Thus, the agent accepts the 
renegotiation proposal.
On the other hand, the principal also receives a larger payoff by 
renegotiating and purchasing the product at a new price P*(Q). It is 1/2S. 
If he defaults on the initial contract or terminates transaction, he receives 
0. He also would do better to renegotiate the contract.43）
Thus, the principal proposes renegotiation and the agent accepts it. 
Their payoffs combination is (1/2S, Q+1/2S). This stabilizes as an 
equilibrium. Thus, the principal’s renegotiation proposal is renegotiation-
proof.
The concept of renegotiation-proof is that if players “value the future 
enough, any feasible and individually rational payoff in the one-shot game 
can be achieved as the average payoff in an equilibrium of the 
corresponding repeated game” and that “[i]t is implemented by designing a 
set of strategies that deter any player from deviating by credibly 
threatening to ‘punish’ any deviations.” By setting up renegotiation-proof, 
the “‘cooperative’” outcomes can be obtained.44） The surplus that the agent 
gains, when it faithfully implements a contract in the first round of play, is 
the same surplus which it obtains in the second round of play in 
renegotiation. The agent cannot improve his payoff by deviating from the 
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43） Suzuki, ibid., pp. 324-327.
44） Jean-Pierre Benoit and Vijay Krishina, “Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games,” 
Econometrica, Volo. 61, No. 2 (March, 1993), p. 303.
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equilibrium in the game.
3　Renegotiation and a new price in the Commission-France 
relationship
French concessions:
The Commission thinks that France is holding up surplus in a “team 
production” of stabilizing the common currency by exceeding the deficit 
limit.
Any excessive French deficit beyond 3 per cent of GDP will likely have a 
depreciating impact upon the euro. The weaker euro works as negative 
externalities to other eurozone states. France is exploiting or holding up 
other eurozone states.45）
France’s government expenditures amounted to 57 per cent of GDP in 
2014. A quarter was spent on pensions. It had been spending on pension 
beyond its means at the expense of other eurozone states. The Commission 
singled out pension overhaul as “urgent” for deficit reduction.46） The 
pension spending was reduced to 55 per cent of GDP in the 2015 budget 
plan but demands were made to cut it further.47）
What was the new price P*(Q) that both the Commission and France had 
agreed upon in renegotiation in October and November 2014? (As a matter 
of fact, renegotiation was scheduled to be finalized in March 2015 upon the 
latest economic data being made available.) In an attempt to persuade the 
Commission to accept another two-year extension of the target year to 
45） About the usage of the concept of “hold up” in this sense, see Suzuki, ibid., p. 324.
46） Hugh Carnegy, “Pensions will test Hollande’s appetite to rein in deficit,” the FT, 14 June 
2013, p. 4.
47） Hugh Carnegy, “France urges Europe to ease deficit cuts,” 6 October 2014, p. 6.
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2017, France had taken or had been forced to take the following three 
measures. 
First, in the Responsibility Pact in January 2014, France set out the plan 
to make a €40bn corporate tax break and a €50bn expenditure reduction 
over three years.
   Second, in November 2014, reviewing France’s budget plan for 2015, 
the Commission demanded that France cut its structural deficit by 0.8 per 
cent, while France “proposed a 0.2 per cent reduction.” France accepted a 
0.5 per cent point cut. EU officials were told that cutting it by 0.5 per cent 
would make it necessary for the Commission to persuade other eurozone 
states, “implying Germany among all.”48）
Though the Commission gave an interim pass to the French budget plan 
in late November 2014, Jean-Claude Junker demanded that France had to 
come up with, in the three months till March 2015, “not only promises but 
a clear calendar, with clear indications when national cabinets will adopt 
reforms, when national parliaments are supposed to do reforms.”49）
If France’s budget plan had been rejected in the review, it would have 
been sent back to the French parliament for revisions. This would have 
been taken as interference by the Commission in the internal domestic 
budgetary process. If any revisions had been made to them, the French 
parliament would have vehemently opposed them before adopting the plan. 
Juncker therefore preferred voluntary reforms by France.50）
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48） Peter Spiegel and James Politi, “Paris faces EU showdown in budget row,” the FT, 27 
October 2014, p. 2.
49） Peter Spiegel, “Junker admits regrets over tax laws that led to under-fire corporate deals,” 
the FT, 28 November 2014, p. 1 and p. 3.
50） Juncker said:” Countries don’t like this lecturing from Brussels,” “So now they are proposing 
themselves what they intend to do, and that’s, I do think, a more respectful way to deal with 
countries and to deal with national parliaments.” Spiegel, “Juncker admits regrets over tax 
laws that led to under-fire corporate deals,” ibid., p. 3.
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Third, France promised to deregulate the notary and pharmacist 
professions and liberalize the labor markets. These labor reforms were 
expected to bring up mid-term economic growth by about 5 per cent. 
However, they were politically very costly, facing hard opposition from 
those whose interests were threatened.  
In addition, the new fiscal compact with semi-automatic sanctions signed 
in March 2012 is scheduled to converge into the EU law in 2017. Its 
present status as intergovernmental treaties might limit the Commission’s 
powers to impose sanctions. Under its current form of intergovernmental 
treaties, the Commission must secure agreements from the signatory 
states, especially Germany, before granting another extension of the target 
year for France.51）
With the scheduled convergence, however, imposing sanctions will 
become more realistic. Even under the strengthened EU fiscal rules, the 
Commission’s powers have been made much powerful. In giving France’s 
and Italy’s budget plans passing grades in late November 2014, Juncker 
said, “I made the choice not to sanction, because that would have been 
easy: you have rules, apply the rules, sanctions, penalties, fines. I made 
another choice.”52） With the new fiscal compact converging into the EU 
law, EU fiscal governance shifts more towards rules rather than 
discretion.53）
In late February 2015, the Commission decided to give France another 
two-year extension to 2017 to meet the 3 per cent deficit limit. It was 
originally supposed to have been met in 2015. The conditions attached were 
51） This is this author’s interpretation. Though the FT reports that the Commission needs to 
clear opposition from Germany, its report does not explain the reason for this.
52） Spiegel, “Juncker admits regrets over tax laws that led to under-fire corporate deals,” ibid.
53） With respect to rules versus discretion, see Bolton and Dewatripont, op. cit., p. 489.
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(1) “to lower its structural deficit, its budget shortfall, from which cyclical 
effects are stripped out, by 0.2 per cent of GDP by later (2015)” and (2) to 
implement the structural reforms essential for future growth.54）
Prior to the Commission’s decision, France passed, on February 17, 
2015, a reform package bill by resorting to an emergency decree, 
bypassing the “reluctant” parliament.55） These reforms were what “the 
European partners” had been demanding as “the price” for another two-
year extension in meeting the deficit target.56） They were pro-business 
reforms including “a wide range of deregulation packages.”57） Prior to this, 
in November 2014, Junker demanded as the condition for another extension 
of the target year that France had to come up with credible and concrete 
plan to meet the deficit target. If France had been judged as taking “no 
effective action,” it would then have unleashed the sanctions proceedings 
against France.58）
Predicting a probable imposition of sanctions in 2017, France was 
expected to bring the deficit below 3 per cent of GDP by that time. Thus, at 
least theoretically, a kind of team project for bringing France’s budget 
deficit below 3 per cent of GDP was expected to materialize in 2017, 
(though in fact, to the contrary, it once again failed to do so).
The European Commission’s investment:
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54） Alex Barker and Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, “France and Italy granted reprieve for breaching 
budget limits,” the FT, 26 February 2015, p. 2.
55） Editorial, “France forces through economic reforms,” the FT, 19 February 2015, p. 8.
56） Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, “Hollande takes emergency measures to pass reforms,” the FT, 18 
February 2015, p. 1.
57） Editorial, “France forces through economic reforms,” op. cit., 
58） In October 2014, the Commission had moved closer to imposing sanctions against France. 
These were the sanctions proceedings the Commission had prepared, though they were not 
actually triggered. Peter Spiegel, “Rehn slams successors for failing to punish Paris over 
repeatedly missing deficit targets,” the FT, 9 March 2015, p. 4.
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The Commission had been criticized for being too lenient on eurozone 
states breaching the fiscal rules. Angela Merkel and Alex Stubb, the then 
new Finnish prime minister, had been two advocates among eurozone 
states for a tougher line on this. However, even they accepted in June 2014 
that the Commission would exercise “’the existing flexibility within the 
rules’” for deficit states so that they would be given “’some room’” to 
relieve their cost for structural reform.59）
In late August 2014, Holland made a proposal for a special eurozone 
growth summit at which the EU should address measures to stimulate 
growth while slowing down the tempo for deficit reduction.60）
Juncker put forth in late November 2014 €315bn of the European Fund 
for Strategic Investment. Out of the €21bn seed fund, €16bn comes from 
the EU budget and €5bn comes from the European Investment Bank (EIB). 
This €21bn works as “partial risk protection.” Based upon this, the 
Commission raised €60bn. This €60bn will be invested in the €315bn of 
projects.61）
4　Payoff realization
As Figure 4 shows, for the Commission the payoff is 1/2S. It will be to 
bring France’s deficit below 3 per cent of GDP and will restore the 
credibility of the EU fiscal rules. 1/2S means for the Commission that it can 
receive back the surplus which France has been holding up in the form of 
excessive deficit over 3 per cent of GDP, and which should belong to the 
59） Peter Spiegel, “Debate on eurozone’s budget rules to test commitment to punish offenders,” 
the FT, 29 August 2014, p. 2.
60） Hugh Carnegy, “Hollande presses for growth summit,” the FT, 29 August 2014, p. 2.
61） Peter Spiegel, “Junker aims to prod reluctant investors,” the FT, November 26、2014 p. 3.
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eurozone community. In doing do, the Commission forces France into not 
only cutting structural deficit but also liberalizing its labor markets. 
Through this, it can put France, back onto a mid-term growth track. 
For France, the payoff is Q + 1/2S. Q means for France that by bringing 
its deficit below 3 per cent of GDP, it can avoid being fined and maintain 
budgetary sovereignty. It will be able to set itself free from the 
Commission’s demands for fiscal policy and structural reforms and any 
further fiscal policy interference.
For France, 1/2S means that it must hand over half of any surplus it had 
been holding up in the form of excessive deficit over 3 per cent of GDP, 
violating the EU fiscal rules.
Ⅷ　Assessment
(1) As shown above, the incomplete contract approach to the eurozone 
fiscal governance makes it possible to analyze the situation as one coherent 
whole process of eurozone fiscal governance from an initial contract, state’s 
realization, renegotiations and setting a new contract, and payoff realization 
and its division.
(2) The incomplete contract approach enables us to see that France is in 
fact holding up surplus which should belong to the eurozone by exceeding 
the deficit limit of 3 per cent of GDP. 
(3) Suzuki’s model illustrates how the flexible sanctioning in proportion to 
sizes of deficit is prerequisite to the credibility of the EU fiscal rules. As 
long as the Commission takes a dichotomous approach to either sanctioning 
or not, minor violations, or even any serious violations short of repeated 
serious ones, are free-ridden. Then, even really serious ones also become 
free-ridden. Maintaining budgetary sovereignty does not become the 
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privilege which might be realistically threatened, if eurozone states fail to 
comply with the EU fiscal rules.
(4) Though this sounds inconsistent with (3), Suzuki’s model also explains 
why the Commission renegotiates with France rather than terminating 
transactions by imposing sanctions. Renegotiations enable parties to a 
contract to undo ex post inefficiency.
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